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Introduction 
he twenty-first Conference of the Parties of the United 
Nations Framework Convention  on Climate  Change  in 
Paris provided the first truly universal international climate 
agreement. Whether the Paris agreement is a meaningful step 
(Friedman, 2015; Harvey, 2015) or just empty promises (Milman, 
2015) depends in part on how people view the climate problem. If 
parties treat climate change as a collective action problem and 
respond to free-riding incentives (Hoel, 1991; Carraro and 
Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994; Nordhaus, 2015), then the 
collection of pledges that comprise the Paris Agreement warrant 
a pessimistic  outlook. But  if parties  are willing to act 
unconditionally, possibly driven by motives beyond material self-
interest (Victor, 2014; Kolstad, 2014), the decentralized and 
flexible approach of Paris may prove fruitful. 
For nearly four decades, nearly 200 sovereign countries have 
gathered to consider how to manage greenhouse-gas (GHG) 
emissions and avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. 
Efforts began at the first World Climate Conference in 1979 and 
led to the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and later the Kyoto Protocol. 
These efforts followed the understanding that the climate change 
problem is a social dilemma, one in which individual and 
collective incentives are misaligned. The social sciences typically 
model the climate problem as a variant of the prisoners’ dilemma, 
one in which countries are collectively better off reducing GHG 
emissions, but are individually better off left unconstrained 
(Barrett, 1994; Nordhaus, 2015). Conventional wisdom developed 
from theoretical predictions suggests that the problem is unlikely 
to be solved by unilateral action; rather, mitigating climate change 
requires global collective action. Garrett Hardin’s classic “Tragedy 
of the Commons” characterizes the necessary collective action as 
“mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” (Hardin, 1968). This 
perspective shaped the UNFCCC goals of pursuing a centrally 
negotiated international agreement that would motivate compre- 
hensive participation, set targets with deep commitments, and 
create enforcement mechanisms to ensure widespread compli- 
ance. Unfortunately, an effective comprehensive “top-down” 
solution to the climate problem has been elusive—for example, 
global carbon dioxide emissions have increased by more than 
50% since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992 (Olivier et al., 
2014). 
In response, experts have shifted their attention to exploring 
alternatives to the idyllic comprehensive top-down climate 
agreement architecture. One point of departure is to pursue a 
much less inclusive approach; one that concentrates on the 
handful of countries that account for the majority of global 
emissions (Victor et al., 2005; Victor, 2006). Similarly, recent 
efforts have suggested the idea of climate clubs—agreements 
among a limited number of governments that link climate action 
to other policy dimensions that reward membership (for example, 
trade tariffs) (Stewart et al., 2013; Falkner, 2015; Nordhaus, 2015). 
These kinds of approaches seek progress by sacrificing inclusivity, 
but they remain built on the standard theoretical prescriptions for 
a collective action problem. 
The Paris Agreement breaks from conventional thinking by 
not including key elements that are typically presumed necessary 
for meaningful international environmental agreements. There is 
no agreed upon global emissions target that is divided into 
individual responsibilities. Countries have autonomy and flex- 
ibility to set and meet emission reductions in the context of their 
national priorities, circumstances and capabilities. And participa- 
tion and compliance are essentially non-binding with stated 
expectations and public review providing social pressure as a soft 
enforcement mechanism. The Paris Agreement achieves “mutual 
agreement” but without “mutual coercion”. Critics, drawing from 
the standard collective action framework, naturally conclude that 
Paris is a series of empty promises that are bound to succumb to 
free-riding. 
The climate problem, however, may have aspects that challenge 
the standard collective action framework. Research clearly 
demonstrates that the context and framing of a collective action 
problem affects the level of cooperation (for example, Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1981; Ostrom, 2000), and this seems particularly 
relevant for a problem as socially and politically complex as 
climate change. Negotiations between parties are just as likely to 
focus on issues of equity, fairness and responsibility, as they are to 
address the monetary benefits and costs of emissions abatement. 
Considering such non-pecuniary concerns, individual incentives 
might be more aligned with collective interests than presumed in 
the standard game-theoretic framework. The notion that some 
parties may act unilaterally is particularly relevant in a repeated 
context like climate change because previous studies suggest that 
initial actions can facilitate reciprocal actions by others (Axelrod 
and Hamilton, 1981; Arce, 2001) and the formation of willing 
groups or climate clubs (Victor, 2011; Hovi et al., 2016). 
Whether the Paris  agreement  is a  meaningful step or just 
empty promises depends in part on how the participants 
approach the climate problem. If parties treat climate change as 
a collective-action problem that leads to free-riding, then the lack 
of incentives to cooperate along with a weak enforcement 
mechanism warrant a pessimistic outlook. But if parties are 
willing to act unilaterally, the menu of promising climate 
agreement architectures may not require mechanisms that 
prevent free-riding. The need for mutual coercion may be 
overstated, and by discounting non-pecuniary motives, the 
benefits of individual action may be undersold. 
We consider the role of non-pecuniary concerns—those 
beyond maximizing one’s own material payoffs—in the climate 
change problem and therefore the possibility that standard game- 
theoretic models may not fully characterize the climate problem. 
We report survey results that reveal how Americans view the 
climate change problem, the extent to which they support 
unilateral domestic action to reduce GHG emissions, and the 
reasons that govern their support for unilateral action. 
 
Methods 
Our survey was administered online through Qualtrics and the sample was drawn 
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (United States respondents) in January 2016. 
Respondents first answered questions regarding their beliefs on whether climate 
change is happening, whether it is caused by human activity and what level priority 
should addressing climate change be given at the national level (see Supplementary 
Information for the survey questions and additional statistics). The question about 
whether respondents support domestic action to address climate change and 
whether that support is conditional on the actions of other countries was borrowed 
from (Leiserowitz et al., 2015). We ask the following question (which we refer to as 
the policy question): 
 
People disagree whether the United  States should reduce greenhouse  gas 
emissions on its own, or make reductions only if other countries do so. Which 
of the following statements comes closest to your own point of view? The 
United States should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions… 
 
1. Regardless of what other countries do 
2. Only if other industrialized countries (such as England, Germany and 
Japan) also reduce their emissions 
3. Only if other industrialized countries AND developing countries (such as 
China, India and Brazil) also reduce their emissions 
4. The US should not reduce its emissions 
5. Don’t know/refuse 
 
The large and consistent support for unilateral domestic climate policy found in 
the literature (Bernauer and Gamfer, 2015; Borick et al., 2015; Leiserowitz et al., 
2015) (and confirmed here) suggests that climate change is not a collective action 
problem in the American mind. Unconditional support for climate policies has also 
been reported in other developed and developing countries (Tingley and Tomz, 
 
 
 
2014). The result is somewhat perplexing because climate change is by definition a 
collective problem and its solution will require a collective response. In order to 
shed light on the motives behind these preferences to act alone, we designed a split- 
sample survey to investigate whether the stated willingness to act is based on 
informed preferences or a naiveté arising from not understanding the strategic 
nature of the problem. 
The survey design entails two features for this purpose. First, after respondents 
answered the question above, they answered six true/false questions to assess their 
understanding of the collective nature of the climate problem (see Supplementary 
Information). The number of correctly answered questions serves as a measure of 
understanding. Second, the sample was split between two versions of the survey— 
an information version provided an explanation of the collective nature of the 
climate problem before delivering the questions above (see Supplementary 
Information), while a no information version did not provide an explanation. 
In total 352 respondents participated in one of two treatments—177 in the no 
information treatment and 175 in the information treatment. All respondents 
reside in the United States and earned US$0.90 for completing the survey, which 
required less than 10 min on average to complete. For our analyses, the key 
demographic variables in our sample were weighted, post survey, to match U.S. 
Census Bureau norms. The sample demographics, survey questions and summary 
statistics are included in the Supplementary Information. This study was approved 
by the Institutional Review Board at Appalachian State University (#14-0272). 
Participants indicated their consent by opting into the online survey and the data 
were analyzed anonymously. 
 
 
Results 
Consistent with other recent surveys that solicit American 
opinions on climate change (Borick et al., 2015; Leiserowitz 
et al., 2015), the majority of respondents in our survey believe 
that climate change is happening (78.7%) with a smaller 
percentage believing that climate change is caused, in part, by 
human activity (65.4%), and 60% of respondents consider climate 
change a very high or high national priority. 
The responses to the policy question soliciting American’s 
willingness to support national reductions in GHG emissions are 
summarized in Fig. 1. Most Americans (79.4%) support the United 
States taking action to reduce GHG emissions regardless of what 
steps  other countries  take (option  #1 from question above). 
Mirroring Leiserowitz et al. (2015), we find that roughly 12% of 
respondents think the United States should only take action 
conditional on other countries making similar efforts (5.7% 
require other developed countries to act and 6.3% require both 
developed and developing countries to take action). A small 
fraction of people stated that the United States should not reduce 
GHG emissions (5.4%) and 3.2% did not know or refused to 
answer. The results suggest that most people do not require a 
collective global response to climate change in order to support 
domestic policies to reduce GHG emissions. The climate change 
problem does not appear to be a collective action problem in the 
American mind, and the widespread willingness to act alone gives 
some hope that a successful climate agreement does not hinge on 
mechanisms to counteract tendencies to free-ride. 
Figure 1 also breaks down the reasons respondents give for 
having a willingness to act alone. The most frequent reason given 
(35.9%) is that the United States should lead by example on 
addressing climate change (Leadership). About one third (31.3%) 
believe that addressing climate change is morally the right thing 
to do (Morals) and 14.1% believe the United States should reduce 
GHG emissions because the United States bears a lot of 
responsibility for climate change (Responsibility). The remainder 
is either willing to support unilateral action because of the 
possibility of energy independence (7.8%), to gain an economic 
advantage (5.1%) or because they believe the United States could 
adequately protect itself from climate change by acting along 
(5.8%). The majority of respondents support unilateral action for 
non-pecuniary concerns about climate change—incentives that 
exist outside the standard collective action framework. 
The support for unilateral climate action in our sample 
corresponds to previous reports and actual legislation (Bernauer 
and Gamfer, 2015; Leiserowitz et al., 2015; Nachmany et al., 
2015). However, we dig a bit deeper to find that the reasons for 
acting alone lie outside the standard collective action framework. 
The findings may suggest that free-riding may not be as central to 
the problem as many presume, but alternatively the findings may 
be an artefact of people not understanding the strategic nature of 
the climate problem. Is support for unilateral action based on 
informed preferences or confusion? This matters because it 
speaks to the stability of people’s willingness to act alone. If 
people understand the problem, their support is relevant to 
domestic action and climate architectures. But if confused, people 
may adopt a conditional stance on climate policy after they learn 
more about the collective nature of the climate problem. 
Answers to the comprehension questions show that respon- 
dents have a good baseline understanding of the collective nature 
of GHG emissions and the related interdependencies between 
nations. In the no information treatment, respondents answered 
69.5% (4.17 of 6.0) of questions correctly on average, with 11.3% 
of them getting a perfect score. Results from the information 
treatment reveals this baseline understanding is improved when 
respondents are provided an explanation of the climate problem. 
 
The U.S. should act to reduce GHG emissions ... Reasons why the U.S. should act to 
reduce GHG emissions regardless of 
Don't Know/Refuse other countries 
 
 
 
 
Don't Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regardless of other countries 
 
 
Morals 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
Responsibility 
 
Self-Protection 
 
 
Energy Independence 
Economic reasons 
 
Conditional on Developed 
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Figure 1 | Willingness to reduce GHG emissions and reasons for supporting unilateral action 
 
 
 
Average scores in the information treatment increased to 82.2% 
(4.93 of 6.0) and the per cent of perfect scores jumped to 36.6% 
relative to the no information treatment. 
We conduct conditional analyses to examine how a person’s 
understanding of the climate problem might explain her support 
for  unilateral  domestic  climate  action.  From  the  design,  we 
examine  three  questions  concerning  the  relationship  between 
people’s understanding of the collective nature of the climate 
problem and their willingness to act alone to address the problem. 
First, we test whether respondent ex ante understanding of the 
collective nature of the climate change problem explains support 
for unilateral domestic climate action. The first two columns in 
Table 1 contain estimates for the following multinomial model: 
 
Policyi¼b0 þ b1Understandingiþy0Xiþεi i ¼ 1; 2yN ð1Þ where 
Policyi denotes the ith individual’s preference for domestic climate  
policy  (five  options:  unconditional,  conditional  on other 
industrial countries acting, conditional on all other countries acting, 
no action regardless and don’t know/refuse); Under- standingi is 
the number of correct answers that respondent i provided to 
the six comprehension questions; Xi is a vector of control 
variables; εi is the well-behaved error term. Two items are noted. 
One, LR tests indicate a preference for a constrained model that  
combines   the   two   conditional   responses   (χ2 = 7.72, p = 
0.461). Two, due to the limited numbers of don’t know/ 
refuse responses (9 of 352), we drop them from the analysis. 
Neither step alters the findings, but they do simplify the policy 
choice set to three options: unconditional, conditional and no 
action (no action omitted baseline). 
We find that a person’s baseline understanding of the collective 
nature of the problem is a significant predictor of whether a 
person supports unilateral climate policy. From the first column 
in Table 1, people that have a better understanding of the 
collective problem are more likely to support unilateral action 
(p = 0.029). While perhaps counter-intuitive, the finding is 
consistent with empirical evidence that better understanding leads 
to more cooperation over time, not less (Ostrom, 2000). The results 
also suggest that greater concern about climate change leads to 
a stronger willingness to act (either alone or conditionally relative 
to not acting at all). Moreover, as illustrated in Table 2, the data 
suggest that increased understanding is correlated with increased 
reliance on non-pecuniary factors. Table 2 shows that 
understanding the problem is associated with the  “more altruistic” 
motives (leadership, morality, responsibility) rather than the 
“more strategic” motives (economic, independence, self- 
protection). 
Next, we test whether providing information about the 
collective nature of the climate problem increases respondent 
understanding of the problem. The middle column in Table 1 
reports estimates from the following linear probability model: 
Understandingi ¼ b0 þ b1Informationiþy0Xiþεi 
i ¼ 1; 2yN ð2Þ 
where Understandingi denotes the number of correct answers that 
respondent i provided to the six comprehension questions; 
Informationi is an indicator variable that signifies whether the ith 
respondent received the information treatment survey (1 if yes; 0 
if no). From Table 1, we see that respondents whoreceived an 
explanation of the collective nature of the climate problem 
performed significantly better on the comprehension questions 
(p = 0.002). 
Finally,  we  test  whether  providing  information  about  the 
collective nature of the climate problem (which increased 
understanding) changes respondent support for unilateral 
domestic climate action. We estimate the following multinomial Ta
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logit model of respondent policy preference: 
 
Policyi¼b0 þ b1Informationiþy0Xiþεi    i ¼ 1; 2yN ð3Þ 
where Policyi denotes the ith individual’s preference for domestic 
climate policy (same three options as the initial model); 
Informationi is an indicator variable that signifies whether the 
ith respondent received the information treatment survey (1 if 
yes; 0 if no). The estimates for this model are found in the last two 
columns in Table 1. The results demonstrate that while providing 
an explanation significantly improved respondents’ understand- 
ing of the climate problem, it does not affect their support for 
climate policy (either acting alone or conditionally). Results 
therefore provide convincing evidence that the widespread 
support for unilateral climate action is  not based on a poor 
understanding of the collective nature of the problem. 
We note two additional results. While concern about climate 
change does not affect respondents’ understanding of the 
problem (p = 0.830), it does significantly affect their willingness 
to act (either alone or conditionally) in both models (po0.01). 
And, all three models were alternatively estimated after dropping 
data from respondents who do not believe climate change is 
happening (from Question 1). The main findings do not change. 
 
Discussion 
Though far from definitive, our findings offer some reasons to 
think the Paris Agreement is more than empty promises. We find 
the climate problem may be more distant from the characteriza- 
tions found in standard game-theoretical  models. Despite the 
strategic nature of GHG mitigation, free-riding may not be as 
central to the problem as these models presume. We find 
widespread support for unconditional domestic action on climate 
change, and we find this willingness to act alone is not based on 
naiveté—rather, it appears to be associated with an awareness of 
the collective nature of the problem. We find the unconditional 
preference is built on appropriate non-pecuniary considerations 
such as leadership, fairness and morality. Though such 
considerations may be marginal in many collective action 
problems, they appear to matter a great deal in the climate 
problem. 
Managing climate change does not appear to be a collective 
problem in the American mind. Previous studies and actual 
legislative actions reveal similar views exist in developing and 
developed countries (for example, Nachmany et al., 2015; 
Tingley and Tomz, 2014). The implication is that much of the 
strategic game-theoretic modeling of the climate problem has 
been grounded in an incomplete formulation of country-level 
preferences. Given preferences beyond material self-interest, 
resolving the climate problem may be less prone to free-riding 
than the standard prisoners’ dilemma model predicts. The 
existence and persistence of the climate change problem 
demonstrate that externalities and free-riding matter, but as 
people’s understanding of climate change evolves, they may 
increasingly view the problem as a moral issue as much as a 
strategic game. While this and other studies rely on survey 
methods that abstract away from details and consequentiality, 
actual unilateral policies undertaken by individual states and 
regions corroborate an interest in unilateral action on climate 
change. 
This study offers evidence on why people support unilateral 
action, and the findings raise questions about the correspondence 
between the climate problem and standard game-theoretical 
modelling. The findings also add to existing arguments that the 
Paris agreement may be a meaningful step forward (for example, 
Victor, 2015). However, there is no ignoring the fundamental 
incentives that invite inadequate climate action by individual Ta
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countries. Thus, while Paris may surprise the critics, its ultimate 
success depends on how it encourages more ambitious efforts 
over time. 
 
 
 
 
References 
Arce MDG (2001) Leadership and the  aggregation  of  international collective 
action. Oxford Economic Papers; 53 (1): 114–137. 
Axelrod R and Hamilton WD (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science; 211 
(4489): 1390–1396. 
Barrett S (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford  
Economic Papers; 46 (1): 878–894. 
Bernauer T and Gamfer R (2015) How robust is public support for unilateral 
climate policy? Environmental Science and Policy; 54 (December): 316–330. 
Borick C, Rabe BG and Mills SB (2015) Acceptance of global warming among 
Americans: Researches its highest level since 2008. A Report from the 
National Surveys on Energy and Environment. University of Michigan: Ann  
Arbor, MI. 
Carraro C and Siniscalco D (1993) Strategies for the international protection of the 
environment. Journal of Public Economics; 52 (3): 309–328. 
Falkner R (2015) International negotiations: Towards minilateralism. Nature  
Climate Change; 5 (9): 805–806. 
Friedman TL (2015) Paris climate accord is a big, big deal. The New York Times 16 
December. 
Hardin G (1968) Tragedy of the commons. Science; 162 (3859): 1243–1248. 
Harvey F (2015) Paris climate change agreement: the world’s greatest diplomatic 
success. The Guardian 14 December. 
Hoel M (1991) Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions 
taken by one country. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management;  
20 (1): 55–70. 
Hovi J, Sprinz DF, Sælen H and Underdal A (2016) Climate change mitigation. 
A role for climate clubs? Palgrave  Communications; 2:16020 doi: 10.1057/ 
palcomms.2016.20. 
Kolstad C (2014) International environmental agreements among  heteroge- 
neous countries with social preferences. NBER working paper No. 20204, 
June. 
Leiserowitz A, Maibach E, Roser-Renouf C, Feinberg G and Rosenthal S (2015) 
Climate Change in the American Mind: October, 2015; Yale Program on Climate 
Change Communication Yale University and George Mason University: New 
Haven, CT. 
Milman O (2015) James Hansen, father of climate change awareness, calls Paris 
talks ‘a fraud’ The Guardian 23 December. 
Nachmany M et al (2015) The 2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of 
Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries. GLOBE International and the 
Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics: London. 
Nordhaus  W  (2015)  Climate  clubs:  Overcoming  free-riding  in  international 
climate policy. American Economic Review; 105 (4): 1339–1370. 
Olivier JGJ, Janssens-Maenhout G, Muntean M and Peters J.H.A.W. (2014) Trends 
in Global CO2 Emissions: 2014 Report, JRC report 93171/PBL report 1490; ISBN 
978-94-91506-87-1. 
Ostrom E (2000) Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives; 14 (3): 137–158. 
Stewart RB, Oppenheimer M and Rudyk B (2013) A new strategy for global climate 
protection. Climatic Change; 120 (1): 1–12. 
Tingley D and Tomz M (2014) Conditional cooperation and climate change. 
Comparative Political Studies; 47 (3): 344–368. 
Tversky A and Kahneman D (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology 
of choice. Science; 211 (4481): 453–458. 
Victor DG (2006) Toward effective international cooperation on climate change: 
Numbers, interests and institutions. Global Environmental Politics; 6 (3): 
90–103. 
Victor DG (2011) Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for 
Protecting the Planet. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK. 
Victor DG (2014) Copenhagen II or something new? Nature Climate Change; 
4 (10): 853–855. 
Victor DG (2015) Approach to climate diplomacy. Yale Environment 360, 15 
DecemberXG. 
Victor DG, House JC and Joy S (2005) A madisonian approach to climate policy. 
Science; 309 (5742): 1820–1821. 
 
Data availability 
The data generated in this study are available at the author’s website (http://www.app- 
state.edu/ ~ mcevoydm/UnderstandingParis_DATASET.xlsx). 
 
Additional information 
Supplementary Information: accompanies this paper at http://www.palgrave-journals 
.com/palcomms 
 
Competing interests: The author declares no competing financial interests. 
Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ 
pal/authors/rights_and_permissions.html 
How to cite this article: McEvoy D, Cherry T (2016) The prospects for Paris: behavioral 
insights into unconditional cooperation on climate change. Palgrave Communications. 
2:16056 doi: 10.1057/palcomms.2016.56. 
 
This  work  is  licensed  under  a  Creative  Commons  Attribution  4.0 
International License. The images or other third party material in this 
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise 
in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, 
users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. 
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
